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Article 1 and Article 2A: Changes in the Uniform
Commercial Code Regarding General Provisions
of Sales and Leases*
Mr. John Krahmer & Mr. Henry Gabriel

MR. KRAHMER: I have been given the task of discussing an exciting part of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC" or "the Code"),
Article 1, which is the definition section. I propose to go through outline, briefly noting some of the more significant changes made in revised Article 1.
The first version of the Code celebrates its fiftieth anniversary this
year. In 1954, the first version of the Code became effective in Pennsylvania, which was the only state to have actually adopted it. Simultaneously, the New York Law Revision Commission studied the then
existing version of the Code, which was highly criticized. This study
ultimately resulted in some significant revisions that became the 1962
draft, which was generally adopted around the country. Now, one of
the big fights that went on in 1954 was the definition of the meaning of
"good faith." There were two opposing camps, composed on one side
of Llewellyn and Mentschikoff and the New York Law Revision Commission on the other. The Llewellyn and Mentschikoff side thought
that the term good faith should include honesty in fact and observance
of reasonable commercial standards. The New York Law Revision
Commission, highly influenced by the New York Banking Association,
disagreed, stating that the definition should include only honesty in
fact, which is what ended up in Article 1. Ultimately, when Article 2
was drafted and the revisions were made in 1962, it combined both
elements and defined good faith as honesty in fact and the observance
of reasonable commercial standards. In 1990, Article 3 was rewritten
and it used the dual element aspect of good faith. During this time
period, revisions of the other Articles took place. The Article 1 definition became more and more outmoded. So the time came to revise
Article 1 and to update a number of those definitions. From the historical standpoint, it became important to revise Article 1 to keep up
with the other changes that had been made.
* This is an edited version of the transcript from the third panel at the DEPAUL BUSINESS
AND COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL SYMPOSIUM, Emerging Trends in Commercial Law:
Surviving Tomorrow's Challenges, held on April 15, 2004.
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Article 1, in its revised form, has not had the same degree of success
as revised Article 9, which was adopted very quickly in all fifty states.
Revised Article 1, as of the present time, has been adopted by only
four United States jurisdictions: Idaho, which adopted it this year,
Texas and Virginia, which adopted it a year ago and the US Virgin
Islands, which adopted it two years ago. Of those four, Idaho, Texas
and Virginia have rejected a proposed section in revised Article 1 designated as section 1-301, dealing with the conflict of laws issue.
The first change I want to mention is the provision dealing with the
scope of the article. Old Article 1 did have a scope provision, but
revised Article 1 specifies that the provisions in Article 1 apply to a
transaction to the extent those transactions are governed by any of the
other Articles of the Code. In effect, this states that the provisions in
Article 1 are only applicable if you find that a transaction is otherwise
governed by the Code. If it is not otherwise governed by the Code,
Article 1 has no particular authority.
Now, what does that mean in a real-life context? Let me give you a
relevant case citation. In Dresser Industry v. Paige Petroleum,1 the
Texas Supreme Court confronted the issue of the meaning of the term
"conspicuous" in a non-UCC situation. The Court concluded that it
would apply the definition of conspicuous as contained in Article 1 of
the UCC to this non-UCC transaction. The Court announced that it
would apply the definition of Article 1 for other types of transactions
whether or not the transaction was covered by a particular Article of
the Code. Notice that this revision of Article 1 states that unless the
provision fits into some other section of the Code, then the Article 1
definition has no special meaning. That means Texas, which has case
law stating that the Court will apply the Code definition of conspicuousness to other types of transactions, will probably relitigate this issue. The underlying statute now provides a definition of conspicuous
and includes a safe harbor provision. If they change the Illinois statute, then cases using the old statute are no longer good law. So that
question is probably going to come up with some of these kinds of
seemingly very modest, almost trivial kinds of revisions. Nevertheless,
they will re-raise some issues.
Variation by agreement is referred to in a number of places in Article 2 with the phrase, "unless otherwise agreed." If this phrase is used
at the very beginning of the section, then the parties are free to otherwise agree from the statutory provisions. That has been changed a
little bit. The meaning of the phrase "unless otherwise agreed" stays
1. 853 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1993).
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the same. However, Article 1 now points out that simply because a
provision does not specifically say "unless otherwise agreed", a party
can modify some of these other provisions. So there is going to have
to be a very careful analysis of each one of the provisions in the various revised Articles 2 through 9 that will have to be tested against this
question of, "is this one of those that they meant in Article 1 that
could, in fact, be contractually modified?" They expanded this to say
that even if it does not say "unless otherwise agreed," a party may be
able to otherwise agree.
The conflict of laws provision is section 1-301 of the Code. This has
been very controversial. The three states that have adopted revised
Article 1 have rejected the official text version of section 1-301. As
revised, section 1-301 states two principal rules: (1) the commercial
transaction rules, and (2) the consumer transaction rules.
In the commercial transaction setting, and this is generic, the text of
section 1-301 states a general principle that the parties to a commercial transaction are free to choose the law of any state or nation to
govern their transaction whether or not that transaction has any particular relationship to that state or nation. For example, a company in
Illinois could contract with a company in New York and they could
contract that the law of California is going to govern the transaction
even though California has no other contact with the transaction.
That particular provision raised some questions. On the consumer
side, there is a complex protective provision in section 1-301 stating
that a party must choose the law of the location where the consumer
resides. In the case of sale of goods, the parties must choose the law
of the location where the contract is signed or where the goods are
going to be delivered. In addition, built into section 1-301 is that parties, even in a commercial transaction, could not choose the law of a
state or nation that violates a fundamental policy of the forum state.
The three states that considered that provision found that it went a
little further than they were willing to go. Therefore, those states, in
effect, retained the old version of what was then section 1-105 and
have left it with a "reasonable relationship" text. Thus, the parties can
choose the law of the state or nation that bears a reasonable relation
to the transaction. Those states have left it essentially the same. I
think we are probably seeing a movement in the direction to this kind
of change in the law. However, it appears that section 1-301 is not
going to be widely adopted. It would not surprise me terribly if the
National Conference of Commissioners goes back and puts this revision back into the form of section 1-105. It will probably come about,
at some time. Maybe not within the next five or ten years, but at some
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point, the concept that the parties should be free to choose the law
they want to govern the transaction without any necessary relationship will carry the day.
In particular, I should mention that there is one example in the
Code where the parties do have absolute freedom of choice in terms
of law. That is in Article 5 dealing with letters of credit. Why is that?
It is because New York has the most widely developed letter of credit
law anywhere. It is not at all uncommon to find parties in letter of
credit transactions choose the law of New York, even though their
transaction otherwise has nothing to do with New York law. It obviously makes sense that the parties would want to choose developed
law. That does not entirely exist in other Articles of the Code. Therefore, section 1-301 and the revision, have caused some questions to
arise.
The concept of electronic record keeping was introduced in Article
9 with the idea that you could have a security agreement in the form
of an electronic record, electronic chattel, paper and so forth. This has
simply been moved over into Article 1 to apply generically to the
Code as a whole. This certainly recognizes that electronic contracting
is here and it is here to stay.
On the definition portion, the term "conspicuous" now has a safe
harbor provision. The safe harbor provision spells out that if you do
these things, including a certain size type, you are home free as far as
whether or not something is conspicuous.
All of the information concerning notices, and record sending have
been rewritten to accommodate electronic communications of one
kind or another.
There have also been organizational changes. At least with a security interest, the concept of distinguishing has been moved to its own
section. The definition of the term "present value" stayed back in the
definitional sections, but the "economic reality" test has now been
moved into a separate section. The obligation of good faith section
has not been substantively changed, but it has been renumbered.
Thus, it is basically reorganization without any real change in
substance.
The definition of good faith has been changed. Those jurisdictions
which allow for a separate cause of action for a violation of the duty of
good faith, have noticed an expansion in that cause of action. Jurisdictions that have denied a separate cause of action for breach of good
faith, such as Washington and Maine, could see an important change
as to the operation of the duty of good faith.
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The concepts of course of performance, course of dealing and trade
usage which used to be partly in Article 1, and partly in Articles 2 and
2A, have now been combined into revised Article 1. Any state that
has adopted revised Article 1 must in turn repeal those other provisions in Articles 2 and 2A.
There used to be a generic statute of frauds in Article 1 that covered transactions not included within some other Article of the Code.
That has simply been eliminated. So there is now no generic statute of
frauds left in the terms of Article 1.
We are not going to talk about it in any greater detail that we already have, but the official Texas version of revised section 1-301
reads a lot like old section 1-105. The revised section 1-301 attempts
to explain and justify itself as to why it does what it does. My guess is
that most of the states are probably going to end up with the old version of section 1-105.
Thank you.
MR. GABRIEL: Being from Louisiana, I had the privilege of drafting a statute that will never govern me. 2 However, the rest of you
likely will be subject to this statute after it has been adopted by the
respective states.
The revisions of the sales and leases provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code have been a long process. Some people think the
revision of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC" or
"the Code"), which took fourteen years, took for an unduly long time.
However, it is important to keep in mind that for the original UCC,
the study group began in 1938 and it was finally promulgated in 1952.
Therefore, as with the revisions, it took fourteen years to draft the
original code. It took another two years before any state adopted the
original code, and it was another two years later before a second state
adopted the code. These processes move very slowly.
When one sees the official draft of the revisions, Articles 2 and 2A
have not been "revised." They have been "amended." This is a little
turn of phrase. What it means to have an amendment as opposed to a
revision of a uniform act entails two considerations.
First, all uniform acts go through the style committee of the Uniform Law Commission. Regardless of how the statute is drafted, the
statute will be styled. The style committee updates the language of
the entire statute to conform to modern statutory language and con2. Henry Gabriel was the reporter for the revisions of Article 2: Sales and Article 2A: Leases
of the Uniform Commercial Code. Professor Gabriel is from Louisiana, and the State of Louisiana has adopted all of the articles of the Uniform Commercial Code except articles 2 and 2A.
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struction, and these changes would include those sections that had not
otherwise been changed. A problem that we perceived was that there
would be changes to sections that were not changed for substantive
reasons, but were changed just for style reasons alone, and these
changes might inadvertently suggest that substantive changes were being made when that was not the case. This fear was stated by one
observer as the possibility of "needless tinkering."
A second aspect of an "amendment" instead of a "revision" is the
signal that unless a section has been changed, there has been no attempt for wholesale revision of the case law. Therefore, existing case
law should still control unless there has been a substantive change to a
specific section.
Let me give you the highlights of what we have done with Article 2
and 2A. I am going to dismiss Article 2A, which covers leases in personal property, very quickly. The amendments to Article 2A are only
there to track equivalent amendments in Article 2. This was not primarily a revision of Article 2A. It was a revision of the sale of goods
provisions in Article 2. The lease provisions in Article 2A are
changed only to conform Article 2A to the new language or definitional changes and the new concepts in Article 2.
I would like to start with what I call the trouble areas. There are a
couple of big issues with the revisions.
The first question that has been posed and will continue to be posed
is whether the code is broken in the first place. There has been some
resistance to the revisions on the basis that there was not a necessary
reason for the revisions; that there was not enough to change to warrant revising something as sacred in American law as the Uniform
Commercial Code.
A second concern is the question of what happens when some states
start to adopt the revisions while other states are slower to do so. This
will cause a certain level of non-uniformity of the Code. The short
answer is "so what". One has to keep in mind that the Code has never
been uniform and there have always been non-uniform amendments
in many states. With the exception of the recent revisions to Article 9
of the uniform Commercial Code, all amendments or revisions to the
Code have taken several years for adoption, and therefore this issue
of a period of non-uniformity is not new, and it has never resulted in
any substantial problems.
There are actually three specific areas in the revisions that have
caused the most criticism. The first is the new statutory concept of a
remedial promise. It is not really a new concept; it is just a new term in
the statute.
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Here is the problem: I buy a new car, and not only do I have the
warranties for the quality of the car, but the seller also promises to
repair or replace any defective parts as well as to do various specific
service work. If the seller were not to do the work or repairs as promised, would that be a breach of a warranty? And if it were a breach of
a warranty, then would it be governed by Article 2 and therefore subject to the statute of limitations from the time of delivery. 3 The problem is that there really is not a breach of the promise to do service
work or repair work until the work is not done. To base a statute of
limitations question on when the car was received, and not when the
seller did not repair the car, does not make sense. Many courts realized that those promises are not really part of Article 2 and that these
promises come from some other area of contract law.
On the other hand, many courts have treated these promises as part
of the initial sale and have locked the buyer into the statute of limitations based on the time of delivery. To some extent, mass market sellers of consumer goods use language that encourage these findings by
courts, because under the Magnuson-Moss Act,4 the federal law mandates language in consumer contracts that refer to "warranties" for
what are "remedial promises" under the revisions of Article 2.5 Thus,
many standard form contracts speak of these service obligations as
warranties because the federal law mandates it. To clear up this confusion, we have introduced the new concept of "remedial promise"
into article 2 solely to resolve this statute of limitations problem.
I would not have thought the introduction of the term and concept
of remedial promises into the code would be very controversial. In
fact, I thought this clarification would be welcome because we would
have courts uniformly understanding the nature of these promises and
how they fit in with the Code. Nevertheless, there has been a lot of
criticism of remedial promises being injected into the code.
Another concept that has received much criticism is the new Article
2, section 2-313B. There are new sections 2-313A 6 and 2-313B. 7 The
reason these are enumerated with a large A and a B is because sections 2-314 and 2-315 have already been taken. These new sections
create two warranty-like obligations in revised Article 2. If I make
what would have been an express warranty under original article 2,
3. U.C.C. § 2-725.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 2302.
6. Revised U.C.C. Section 2-313A provides specifically for the obligation to the remote purchaser created by record packaged with or accompanying goods.
7. Revised U.C.C. Section 2-313B provides for obligations to the remote purchaser created by
communication to the public.
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the law is the same. However, article 2 deals with transactions between buyers and seller, and therefore it presupposes that the parties
are in privity. Yet, often the manufacturer of goods, when the manufacturer makes a promise about the goods, is really making the promise to someone down the distribution chain. For example, when a car
manufacturer advertises on television, the manufacturer is not directing the advertisement of its product to the dealers, but are directing it to the ultimate purchasers.
The question is could these non-privy promises flow through to the
parties further down the distribution chain. The case law has always
been unclear, and the answer has depended upon a combination of
factors such as the type of damages that the buyer received as well as
whether the promise was an express or an implied one.
These questions have been addressed in these new statutory provisions. Thus, if a seller makes what would otherwise be an express
warranty that is contained in the packaging of he goods, the promises
in that material is covered under section 2-313A.8 That has not been
very controversial.
Similarly, under new section 2-313B, if where an upstream seller
makes what would otherwise be an express warranty in advertising or
another similar communication, the seller is responsible for those
promises to a downstream buyer who could reasonably be expected to
rely on the promise. 9 This provision has been the subject of much
criticism, and as Article 2 works its way through the legislatures this
section is likely to spark a lot of debate.
Now, I have always considered this criticism as a bit harsh. I assume that if a seller does not want to be bound by promises about a
product, there is a very easy way to eliminate that possibility. Do not
make promises in the first place. So it has always seemed to me sort
of a strong criticism or an unfocused, unfounded criticism when people say we do not want to be bound by what we promise. But this is
an area of concern and one that I think may continue to cause
problems with the revisions.
The other area in the revisions that has been subject to concern is
the question of scope. When the final drafting committee began its
work in 1999, the work was primarily done in a year. Then it took
three more years to finish it because we spent three years debating the
scope of Article 2.
8. Rev. U.C.C. § 2-313A(3).
9. Rev. U.C.C. § 2-313B(3).

2004]

ARTICLE

1

AND ARTICLE

2A

This debate is a political debate. It is not one of substance. Article
2 deals with transactions in goods, and the fight was what is a
"good."' 0 The question is whether a given industry's products are
covered by Article 2. I produced 141 drafts of the scope of Article 2. I
am happy to say that the first one that I produced was the one that
was adopted, and it still covers transactions in goods.
The core debate was how to deal with software. The scope provision has not been changed, but we did change the definition of goods
to explicitly exclude information.1 1 The assumption is that software is
by definition information. Therefore, in a pure information contract,
you are governed by some other law than Article 2, such as the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act. If the transaction is the
2
sale of goods without software, Article 2 applies to the transaction.'
The question is the middle ground. It is one thing to discuss a pure
software transaction. It is another thing to discuss transactions of
pure tangible goods. However, your refrigerator, your toaster, most
of the wrist watches you have on, are tangible goods with some
software built in. What do we do with those mixed transactions? The
answer is that we leave it to the courts. I personally believe this is the
soundest decision. If after having put as many minds to work as hard
as we did on the problem, and the fact that no one could come to a
workable solution, maybe the answer is to ask the courts to do what
the courts are pretty good at doing. Work on it on a case-by-case basis
to determine whether this transaction is within Article 2, outside of
Article 2 or partially within Article 2 and partially outside. That is
how we resolved the scope issue. Hopefully this will be seen as a
workable solution.
An interesting fact is that the rest of the world does not necessarily
make the division between goods and information we make. The
Germans, for example, simply consider mass marketed software as
goods. The Danish take the position that software is a good as well.
To the Danish, it is a virtual good. The traditional division is that
software, if not considered goods, is considered services, and the law
in many parts of the world have taken the position that software, to
the extent that it is not categorized as goods, can be categorized as
10. Rev. U.C.C. § 2-103(k) provides: "Goods" means all things that are movable at the time of
identification to a contract for sale. The term includes future goods, specially manufactured
goods, the unborn young of animals, growing crops, and other identified things attached to realty
as described in Section 2-107. The term does not include information, the money in which the
price is to be paid, investment securities under Article 8, the subject matter of foreign exchange
transactions, or choses in action.
11. Rev. U.C.C. § 2-103(k).
12. Rev. U.C.C. § 2-103(k).
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services. I think it is fair to say that it is pretty much of an American
position to treat software as information. We need to appreciate our
insularity on this subject.
I have always thought Article 2 was and is fairly balanced. It does
not privilege buyers over sellers or vice versa. But in the debates during the revisions, there was often a tension based on an assumption
that the whole world is somehow divided up into sellers, which were
all big, corporate sellers, and then there were consumer buyers. There
appeared to be in the debates no middle ground assumed; no small
sellers or commercial buyers. Thus, this tension and polarity exists as
if we are not all consumers in one way or another. Consumer issues
were always raised in the process as if somehow we were drafting a
uniform consumer code and not a Uniform Commercial Code. I think
this tension took up much of the energy that could have been usefully
used otherwise.
Nevertheless, the revisions provide much needed clarification on
some consumer interests. First, revised Article 2 specifically provides
that any rule of law, any statute, any court ruling, or any administrative ruling that governs consumer issues is not displaced by Article 2.13
This relationship was not always clear prior to the revisions. Of
course, we have to keep in mind, as lawyers, whenever you enact a
new statute, be it an amendment or revision of an old statute; there is
an argument that the newer statute, to the extent that it might contradict an older statute, would displace it. Legislative intent would suggest that the newer law is the governing law in the case of a conflict.
To dispel this possibility, revised Article 2 specifically provides that it
14
does not displace any consumer protections whatsoever.
Another area that is not specific to Article 2, but has to be kept in
mind, is the world of electronic contracting. There is this big flurry in
all of our statutes to provide for electronic contracting. Amazon.com
sold a couple billion dollars worth of books and made a phenomenal
amount of money selling books over the internet without a clue
whether they had the legal authority to do it or not. They did not
know whether it violated the statute of frauds. They did not care because they simply factored in the small amount of legal risk that could
be there and said it is better to make money. So we have now moved
into the area of E-contracting, and our statutes are trying to catch up
with business models. But it is important to keep in mind that all of
these state statutes, such as the Uniform Commercial Code, are gov13. Rev. U.C.C. § 2-102.
14. Rev. U.C.C. § 2-102 provides, in part: "nor does this Article impair or repeal any statute
regulating sales to consumers, farmers or other specified classes of buyers."
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erned by Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act
("E-sign"), 15 and as a federal statute, it preempts state law. E-sign has
built into it a tremendous amount of consumer protections. 16 Moreo17
ver, that part of the federal statute is not waivable by the states.
Thus, when we finished up the revisions of Article 2, we understood
that the federal law was going to impose a good number of consumer
protections in addition to what was contained in the state law.
There are other small changes that provide for new consumer protections. One of the questions under original Article 2, in the case of
the seller's right to cure, was whether the seller could cure not only if
the buyer rejected the goods, but also if the buyer revoked acceptance."' The cases had never come to any conclusion. The revisions
now provide, in appropriate circumstances, that a seller can cure if
there has been a revocation of acceptance.' 9 However, this is not the
case in a consumer contract. The assumption is that, in a consumer
contract, if I have received the goods, and they are so defective that I
really cannot use them, the seller should not have a second bite of the
apple in trying to deliver conforming goods.
There are other changes that primarily help consumers but help
other buyers as well. The prior law required a notice of the breach. If
the buyer did not notify the seller of a breach, the buyer lost all remedies under the code. 20 Nobody could ever figure out why we had that
Draconian law. It has now been revised so that, to the extent that the
buyer does not notify the seller of a breach, the buyer is barred from
remedies only to the extent that the seller is actually harmed. 21 This is
primarily to help buyers who probably would not have any idea that
they had to call up the seller and complain before they sued the seller
for the fact that the television blew up.
Article 2 has a magnificent new package of electronic contracting
provisions. In addition, the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act has
now been adopted in forty-three states22 and probably will be adopted
in four or five more this year. Those states that do not provide for the
15. Pub. L No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464 (2000) (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7006, 7021, 7031).
16. For example, affirmative consent, limitations on particular types of notice that may not be
provided by electronic mail, and clear and conspicuous notice requirements, to name just a few.
17. E-Sign § 101 (2000).
18. U.C.C. § 2-508.
19. Rev. U.C.C. § 2-508.
20. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a).
21. Rev U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a)(which provides that a limitation exists only in situations where
the seller has been prejudiced by the lack of timely or sufficient notice of breach).
22. For information on the status of UETA's passage in the states, see <http://www.uetaonine.
com.>
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Uniform Electronic Transactions Act by state law are subject to Esign, which is the federal legislation which provides that if a state have
not adopted the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, then the federal legislation will provide primarily for the same.23 Now, the state
and federal legislation can be boiled down to a handful of principals.
They are in effect, that if you do something electronically that would
otherwise be required by law to be done by paper, it is okay to do this
electronically. In addition, if the law requires a signature, an electronic signature will suffice. In other words, these laws provide for
medium neutrality. 24 We do not really care how you do it. These provisions do not create any substantive new rules of law. They simply
say an electronic record is the same as a piece of paper. But then
these laws, other than Article 2, do not elaborate what the legal effect
of that would be. Article 2's provisions, the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act provisions, and E-sign's provisions with some very
insignificant differences, all provide this.25 Thus although revised Article 2 provides for electronic contracting, in many respects, I think
these provisions are unnecessary because we have other law that provides for the same thing.
The statute of frauds is the venerable English statute that has been
abolished in England for many years for being superfluous and irrelevant. It is also a statute that is truly misunderstood by the majority of
lawyers in the world. And yet, we have retained the statute of frauds
with a couple of minor changes. The five-hundred dollar limit that
everyone learned in law school, which originally was ten pounds sterling when the statute was adopted in the 17th century, has now been
raised to five-thousand dollars. The five-hundred dollar limit was actually in the Uniform Sales Act which goes back to 1905. Since the
five hundred dollar amount had not dealt with inflation for the last
one-hundred years, we decided to inflate it by a factor of ten. Maybe
we got it right. I suspect we did not. I think if we studied the numbers, which we never did, it probably should be twenty-five thousand
dollars.
There was one issue in which we had an incredibly spirited discussion that went through two annual meetings of the American Law Institute and which was ignored by everybody but the law professors
because only the law professors cared. As you remember, section 2201 says that if there is a quantity term in the writing, then the contract is limited to the amount stated in the quantity term. Now, what
23. E-Sign §§ 101 & 102 (2000).
24. E-Sign § 101.
25. UETA § 7, Comment 1; E-Sign § 101; Rev U.C.C. § 2-204 (general formation).
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the statute does not say is that you have to have a quantity term. 26
For purposes of the statute of frauds, Article 2 has never required that
the writing that proves the existence of the contract has to state a
quantity term. However, the original comments state this requirement
of a quantity term, and the comments have always stated that. 27 The
debate that went on for several years was whether to remove that line
2 8 So
from the comments or not. The line is still in the comments.
according to the comments but not the law, 29 Article 2 requires a
quantity term to meet the purposes of the statute of frauds
There are significant changes in the parole evidence rule. 30 As you
are aware, when we talk about as the parole evidence rule, we are
often speaking of two separate rules. What the terms are in the agreement is the true parole evidence rule. The second question is, once
the terms are determined, what do they mean? This question of interpretation is separate from the question of what terms are in the
agreement. Original Article 2 conflated these two questions for purposes of course of dealing, course of performance and usage of trade,
which are the three categories of evidence in addition to the express
terms that are used to interpret what a contract means. 31 Thus, the
terms of the original agreement must have been determined to be
vague or ambiguous before course of dealing, course of performance
and usage of trade could be introduced into the agreement at all.
Thus, there was confusion between the question of what is in the contract, and what the contract means. We have corrected that. For purposes of interpreting a contract, parties can always introduce evidence
in the course of performance, course of dealing and usage of trade to
explain express terms without having to convince the court beforehand that the express terms were unclear in the first place. 32 This is a
useful clarification.
My favorite revision is Article 2-207, i.e. the battle of the forms.
Now, as you all know, old Article 2-207 was based on an arbitrary
26. U.C.C. § 2-201(which allows for the omission of a term without providing for a price term
limitation) and Rev. U.C.C. § 2-201 (the terms and provision were carried over with minor style
changes).
27. 2-201 Comment 1, which provides that"[t]he only term which must appear is the quantity
term which need not be accurately stated but recovery is limited to the amount stated."

28. Rev. U.C.C. § 2-201 Comment 1.
29. Of course, the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code are not considered binding
and are not adopted; however, they are considered in numerous court decisions.

30. U.C.C. § 2-202.
31. U.C.C. § 2-202(a).
32. By adding an additional provision. Rev. U.C.C. § 2-202(2) which provides: "Terms in a
record may be explained by evidence of course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of
trade without a preliminary determination by the court that the language used is ambiguous."

704

DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 2:691

common law principle that was rarely applied anyway. This common
law principle was based on the idea was that whichever party got the
last piece of paper in won on that parties terms even if the other party
had submitted conflicting terms. The problem with this rule was, that
when it was applied, it arbitrarily chose one party's terms over the
other party's terms. The nice thing about the rule, though, was that it
was easy to apply, because all that had to be done was figure out
which piece of paper was the last one sent.
That rule did not satisfy the original drafters of Article 2, so they
came up with original Article 2-207, which, as you all understand, is
totally incomprehensible. Original Comment 333 contradicts Original
Comment 6. 3 4 Both comments contradict the express language of part
2 of the article. 35 There are, as you remember, other problems. In
addition, part 1 of original Article 2-207 deals with contract formation,
36
while the rest of the section deals with contract interpretation.
Those are two wholly separate issues, and when they are jammed into
one section, the confusion builds. Although original Article 2-207 was
equally as arbitrary as the common law rule it was meant to replace, it
lacked the simplicity of the common law rule. One had to love it. It is
a ridiculous statute.
Revised Article 2-207 changes all of this. First, all of the formation
of contract aspects of section 2-207 have been moved to the section on
formation. 37 The new rule provides that the terms that are the same
on the parties' records, terms that they otherwise agreed to, or terms
that would be given by default by the UCC, are part of the contract.
Everything else is knocked out. 3 8 This is the right result. For otherwise, if one party provides a term, and the other party provides a conflicting term, the parties have not agreed to either term. The new rule
is a total knock-out doctrine. Those terms that are agreed upon are
part of the contract. Those terms not agreed upon are not in the
contract.
There are several important changes to the remedies provisions as
well. Original section 2-708(2), the lost profits provision, provided that
the seller had to reduce the damages by the amount the seller received
33. Comment 3 enumerates that additional terms become part of the agreement unless the
term is material. U.C.C. § 2-207 Comment 3.
34. Comment 6, in confusing contrast to Comment 3, allows for the inclusion of additional
terms provided the term is implicitly assented to if the term is fair and commercially reasonable.
U.C.C. § 2-207 Comment 6.
35. Construing additional terms as 'proposals.' U.C.C. § 2-207.
36. U.C.C. § 2-207.
37. Rev U.C.C. § 2-206(3) (moving 2-207(1)).
38. U.C.C. § 2-207.

2004]

ARTICLE

1

AND ARTICLE

2A

from a resale. Under this provision, the seller would never receive any
damages. It was a contradictory statement universally ignored by the
courts, and we took that out.
The measurement of the buyer's damages in the absence of a cover
was measured as the difference between the contract price and the
market price when the buyer learned of the breach, and not when the
goods should have been tendered. This raised two problems. One
was the factual question of proving when the buyer learned of the
breach. The second problem is that the time when the buyer learned
of the breach did not reflect the true bargain, as the buyer was entitled
to the difference in the contract price and the value of the goods at the
time and place the goods should have been delivered.
This has been corrected, and the point of measurement for the
buyer's damages is now at the time and place tender should have occurred. Sellers are now expressly entitled to consequential damages.
Many courts had provided for this, but these damages are now expressly in the statute under Article 2-710. 39 This however, is subject to
the exception of consumer contracts. Sellers cannot get consequential
damages against a consumer, although I have never figured out the
hypothetical where that would occur anyway. Also, in an expansion
of the common law rule, but reflecting modern commercial practices,
except in a consumer contract, parties can freely contract for specific
performance.
As to one last point, original Article 2 had one single four year
statute of limitations. 40 This did not in anyway meet the requirements
of the Code, and the new statute of limitations section is now have the
longest section in the Code, and it provides for eight different time
41
periods depending on the situation.
And with that, I thank you.

39. Rev. U.C.C. § 2-725 provides:
(1) Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller include any commercially reasonable charges,
expenses or commissions incurred in stopping delivery, in the transportation, care, and custody
of goods after the buyer's breach, in connection with return or resale of the goods or otherwise
resulting from the breach.
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the buyer's breach include any loss resulting from
general or particular requirements and needs of which the buyer at the time of contracting had
reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by resale or otherwise.
(3) In a consumer contract, a seller may not recover consequential damages from a consumer.
40. U.C.C. § 2-725(1).
41. Rev. U.C.C. § 2-725.

